Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 19
Issue 4 Fall 1986

Article 6

1986

Nazi War Criminals in the United States: It's Never Too Late For
Justice
David R. Gelfand

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David R. Gelfand, Nazi War Criminals in the United States: It's Never Too Late For Justice, 19 Vanderbilt
Law Review 855 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol19/iss4/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Nazi War Criminals in the United
States: It's Never Too Late For Justice
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

856

INTRODUCTION ......................................
INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS

AND THE NUREMBERG

858

TRIALS ............................................

III.

How

NAZI WAR CRIMINALS CAME TO THE UNITED

STATES: THE DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF

IV.

THE

IMMIGRATION

AND

AND NAZI INVESTIGATIONS:
V.

CONGRESSIONAL

1948 .....

NATURALIZATION

1945-1973 .............

OUTCRY AND

864

CHANGES:

NECESSARY

1973-1979 ......................................
VI.

THE DENATURALIZATION PROCESS ...................

A.
B.
VII.

VIII.
IX.
X.

The JudicialHistory of Fedorenko v. United States
DenaturalizationCases Since Fedorenko ........

THE DIFFICULTIES

OF DENATURALIZING

NAZI

THE EXTRADITION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS -

866
872
874
877

WAR

880

CRIMINALS IN THE UNITED STATES ..................
THE DEPORTATION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS .......
CASE OF IVAN DEMJANJUK ...........................
CONCLUSION ........................................

860

SERVICE

884
THE

885

892

856

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 19.855

"The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and so devastating that civilization cannot tolerate
their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated."
-Justice Robert H. Jackson,
Chief United States Prosecutor,
Opening Statement before the
International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, November, 1945.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The conclusion of the international manhunt for Josef Mengele in
1985 reawakened the conscience of the world. Mengele, the Nazi, "Angel of Death," sent hundreds of thousands of innocent victims to their
deaths at Auschwitz and performed heinous medical experiments on
thousands of others. He was, perhaps, the most "wanted" war criminal
of the Third Reich.2 In August, 1985 an international team of forensic
scientists and medical examiners confirmed Mengele's death as the victim of a drowning accident. 3 The search and identification of Mengele,
the capture of and impending trial of Klaus Barbie - the "Butcher of
Lyon" - and the recent extraditions from the United States of Andrija
Artukovic to Yugoslavia and Ivan Demjanjuk to Israel signal a rebirth of
international cooperation in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals. They
provide an opportunity to renew the spirit of the Moscow Declaration 4
and London Agreement 5 and remind the international community of its
legal and moral obligations to bring these criminals to justice.
From the outset, one question looms: Why bother? Why expend valuable economic, physical and judicial resources to find these aged
criminals and prosecute crimes committed more than forty years ago? In
response, the words of Justice Jackson cannot be improved upon:
What makes this inquest significant is that these [criminals] represent
sinister influences that will lurk in the world long after their bodies have
returned to dust. They are living symbols of racial hatreds, of terrorism

1.

(1946).
The reward for Mengele's capture reached $3.4 million by 1985. Johnson, Hunting the "Angel of Death", TIME, May 20, 1985, at 33.
R. JACKSON, THE CASE AGAINST THE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS 3

2.

3. Ultimately, Mengele's dental x-rays matched the remains of a body found in Argentina. Angel's
28, 1986, at 18,
4. See infra
5. See infra

Wings Clipped At Last, TIME, April 7, 1986, at 43; Wall St.J., Mar.
col. 1.
note 8 and accompanying text.
note 10 and accompanying text.

19861

NAZI WAR CRIMINALS

and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power. They are symbols
of fierce nationalism and of militarism, of intrigue and war-making which
have embroiled Europe generation after generation, crushing its manhood,
destroying its homes, and impoverishing its life. They have so identified
themselves with the philosophies they conceived and with the forces they
directed that any tenderness to them is a victory and an encouragement to
all the evils which are attached to their names. Civilization can afford no
compromise with the social forces which would gain renewed strength if
we deal ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those forces
now precariously survive."
There exists an ever-increasing need to educate current and future generations to the causes and events of the Holocaust, and a related need to
bring war criminals to justice. Escalating military power, the alarming
increase in terrorist activity, and the proliferation of nuclear weaponry,
coupled with racial, religious, and political tensions, offer compelling
support for those needs. As Justice Jackson warned: "If we cannot eliminate the causes and prevent the repetition of these barbaric events, it is
not an irresponsible prophecy to say that this twentieth century may yet
'7
succeed in bringing the doom of civilization."
While this note focuses on Nazi war criminals living in the United
States, it calls for international cooperation in prosecuting war
criminals. It traces the history of post-war agreements relating to the
prosecution of Nazi war criminals, and their application at the Nuremberg Trials. This note then examines how Nazi war criminals entered
the United States following World War II, and how they have lived here
for four decades virtually unnoticed. Additionally, this note analyzes the
recent efforts of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), a branch of
the Department of Justice, to prosecute Nazi war criminals living in the
United States. Finally, this note argues that justice is best served through
a rebirth of the spirit embodied in the Moscow Declaration and London
Agreement and calls for the reestablishment of an international tribunal
with criminal jurisdiction over international war criminals. Additionally,
the recent Artukovic and Demjanjuk extraditions should stand as strong
precedent, and signal an invitation to countries with criminal jurisdiction
over Nazi war criminals to make similar extradition requests.

6. R.
7.

JACKSON,

R. JACKSON,

supra note 1, at 4.
THE NUREMBERG CASE

120 (1972) (from Justice Jackson's Closing

Address before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, July 26, 1946).
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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE NUREMBERG TRIALS

On November 1, 1943 the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union signed a Declaration of German Atrocities, 8 later known as the
Moscow Declaration. Although the Moscow Declaration did not provide
a method for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, it did signify early
recognition of the Nazi atrocities and the need for international cooperation in bringing the perpetrators to justice. Specifically, the agreement
stated:
[T]hose German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who
have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in

. .

.atroci-

ties, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which
their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and
punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free
governments which will be created therein.'
Following victory in 1945, the United States, France, Great Britain,
and the Soviet Union signed the London Agreement' ° reaffirming the
values of the Moscow Declaration and formally pledging to deliver Nazi
war criminals"' to a swift and sobering justice. The London Agreement
established an International Military Tribunal for the trials of major
Nazi war criminals "whose offenses have no particular geographical location."' 12 The Charter of the London Agreement provided the Tribunal
8. The Declaration of German Atrocities, November 1, 1943, reprinted in Alleged
Nazi War Criminals:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and
International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59
(1977) [hereinafter Moscow Declaration].
9. id.
10. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279
[hereinafter London Agreement] (19 other states acceded to this Agreement).
11. For a detailed discussion of the distinction between "Nazi" and "war criminal,"
see Comment, Denaturalizationof Nazi War Criminals: Is There Sufficient Justice For
Those Who Would Not Dispense Justice? 40 MD. L. REv. 39, 29 n.2 (1981). Briefly, a
Nazi was someone who belonged to the Nazi party (NSDAP, translated as the National
Socialist German Worker's Party). A "war criminal," as defined in the London Agreement, was someone guilty of at least one of the following: "crimes against peace," "war
crimes," or "crimes against humanity." Conspiracy to commit one of these acts also constituted a crime. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. Furthermore, at the Nuremberg Trials, membership in the Nazi party did not, itself, constitute a war crime, though
membership in certain Nazi contingents, such as the Gestapo, was sufficient to support a
guilty verdict.
12. London Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1, 59 Stat. 1544, 1544, E.A.S. No. 472,
at 1, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 280.
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with jurisdiction over persons who, "acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations," committed crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against
humanity. I"
The Nuremberg Trials, which began in late 1945, implemented the
intentions of the London Agreement. 4 The International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg tried twenty-two defendants. 5 The Nuremberg
Trials, which lasted over ten months, resulted in nineteen convictions
and three acquittals. Of those found guilty on October 1, 1946, twelve
were sentenced to death, three to life imprisonment, and four to periods
of imprisonment ranging from ten to twenty years.""
Subsequently, the parties to the London Agreement formed indepen13. London Agreement, supra note 10, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, E.A.S. No. 472, at 4, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 286. These
crimes were defined as:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such
plan.
Id., 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, E.A.S. No. 472, at 4, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288.
14. For an excellent account of the Nuremberg Trials, see R. CONOT, JUSTICE AT
NUREMBERG (1983) and A. TUSA & J. TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1984).
15. Originally twenty-four defendants were to face charges at Nuremberg. One
scheduled defendant, Dr. Robert Ley, Head of the Reich Organization, committed suicide before the hearing opened. Another, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halback, a
Nazi industrialist, was found to be unfit for trial and the court directed separate
proceedings.
16. A. RUCKERL, THE INVESTIGATION OF NAZI CRIMES, 1945-1978, at 25-26
(1980) (Mr. Ruckerl provides a list of each of the 22 defendants and their respective
sentences).
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dent tribunals at Nuremberg, which continued the prosecution of Nazi
war criminals through the middle of 1949. The American Military Tribunal conducted twelve major trials. It tried 184 persons and sentenced
142 war criminals.1 7 Other American tribunals conducted "lesser" trials,
and by the close of the proceedings in Nuremberg, the United States
tribunals had instituted charges against 1,941 persons, of whom 1,517
were sentenced and 367 were acquitted. In 57 cases the charges were
dropped."8
On January 31, 1951, United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy granted pardons to the convicted war criminals, mitigating the severity of their sentences (with the exception of death sentences)."9 By
1958, all the prisoners convicted by the United States tribunals were
released.2 °
Despite the trials at Nuremberg, the majority of Nazi war criminals
avoided prosecution. Moreover, some convicted criminals did not serve
full sentences. The initial commitment of the Allied nations to justice
proved to be short-lived.
III.

How NAZI WAR CRIMINALS CAME TO THE UNITED STATES:
THE DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF 1948

"How did Nazi war criminals come to the United States? We invited
them in."
-Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Director
of the Justice Department's
Office of Special
Investigations, 1980-83."
Most Nazi war criminals living in the United States entered the coun-

17. Of the 184 accused, seven were not tried because of illness or death, 35 were
acquitted, 98 were given sentences ranging from 18 months to 20 years imprisonment, 20
were sentenced to life imprisonment, and 24 were sentenced to death, though only 12 of
the death sentences were actually carried out. Id. at 26-29.
18. Of the 1,517 persons sentenced, 324 were death sentences, 247 life imprisonment,
and 946 sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. Id. at 28-29; see also H.R. REP.
No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4700, 4705. Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and other countries also held
war crimes trials; for an account of those proceedings see A. RUCKERL, supra note 16, at
29-31.
19. A. RUCKERL, supra note 16, at 135 n.6.
20. Id.
21. A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS 28 (1984).
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try under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DP Act).22 The DP Act
adopted the definition of "displaced person" provided in Annex I of the
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO Constitution). 23 This definition excluded all persons shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of
24
the second world war in their operations against the United Nations.
In theory, the DP Act excluded Nazi war criminals. In actuality, however, a Nazi who lied about his past could easily enter the United
States.25
After the close of World War II, many Nazi sympathizers posed as
war victims and sought refuge in the displaced person camps (DP
camps) in Germany. The New York Times reported in 1945 that many
Nazi collaborators lived in these camps under the care of the United
States military. 28 The article further estimated that one-third of the Balts
in the DP camps had either fought for the Germans or been members of
the Gestapo or SS.27 United States Army investigations later confirmed
these reports. Hundreds of thousands of refugees crowded the DP
camps, hindering the United States goal of reconstructing Germany. 28
The DP Act authorized the entry of 202,000 displaced persons into
the United States over two years. 29 Rather than providing for random
selection of eligible persons, however, the DP Act operated to exclude
many concentration camp victims and include Baltic, Ukranian and ethnic Germans.3 0 Because the DP Act provided only for displaced persons

22. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), as
amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (expired 1952)
[hereinafter DP Act].
23. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, opened for signature
Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered intoforce Aug.
20, 1948) [hereinafter IRO Constitution]. The International Refugee Organization
(IRO) was a committee established by the United Nations for the purpose of resettling
persons displaced by World War II.
24. Id., Annex I, pt. II, § 2(a)-(b), 62 Stat. 3037, 3051-52, T.I.A.S. No. 1846, at 17,

18 U.N.T.S. 3, 20.
25. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 5.
26. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1945, at A9, col. 3.
27. Id.
28. See A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 14.
29. DP Act § 3(a), 62 Stat. at 1010.
30. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 16.
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who entered Germany, Austria, or Italy before December 22, 1945,1 it
declared close to 100,000 Jewish refugees who fled from Poland in 1946
ineligible. Ultimately, only about one percent of the displaced person
population were Jewish refugees who had been in the DP camps since
December 1945.32 According to one critic, "Congress [carefully said that]
85 percenta of the Jews in DP camps need not apply to come to
America.""
Congress established quota systems for the eligible displaced persons.
Forty percent of the United States visas went to persons "whose place of
origin or country of nationality has been de facto annexed by a foreign
power."1 4 This quota reflected a policy to admit Latvians, Lithuanians,
and Estonians, because the Soviet Union had annexed their countries, an
act not officially recognized by the United States government.3" Thirty
percent of the visas went to farmers,"6 thereby favoring Ukranians and,
to a lesser extent, Poles. 7 Finally, the DP Act adopted a preference for
Volksdeutsche-persons of German ethnic origin from Eastern Europe. 8
Fifty thousand Volksdeutsche entered the United States under the DP
Act. Many of them were Nazi collaborators who returned to Germany at
the end of World War II or shortly thereafter. Arguably, anti-semitism
played a formidable role in establishing these quotas under the DP act.39
As a result, the DP Act denied admittance to many legitimate refugees.
Consequently, it proved "easier for a former Nazi to enter the United
States than for one of the Nazis' innocent victims."' 0
Section 13 of the DP Act denied admission to "any person who is or
has been a member of, or participated in, any movement which is or has
been hostile to the United States or the form of government of the United
States.""' In accordance with this clause, the proponents of the Act established a two-step screening process to keep out Nazi collaborators.
Unfortunately, these preventive measures proved ineffective.
The IRO Constitution required refugees to be screened and certified

31.
32.

DP Act § 2(c)(1), 62 Stat. at 1009.
A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 16.

33. Id.
34. DP Act § 3(b), 62 Stat. at 1010.
35. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 17.
36. DP Act § 6(a), 62 Stat. at 1012.
37. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 17.
38. DP Act § 12, 62 Stat. at 1013-14.
39. See A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 17-18.
40. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1948, at Al, col. 6, & A3, col. 5.
41. DP Act § 13, 62 Stat. at 1014.
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prior to admittance to any nation.4 2 For example, one who voluntarily
assisted the enemy in military operations or in persecuting civilians could
not be certified." This level of the screening process was ineffectual and,
arguably, corrupt. 44 Moreover, the DP Act created a huge loophole
when it authorized 50,000 visas for Volksdeutsche. Under the IRO Constitution, Volksdeutsche left their homes voluntarily to assist the German
war effort, and thus technically were not "displaced." Since the IRO
dealt only with displaced persons, the Volksdeutsche avoided the first
level of screening.4 5
The DP Act itself established the second level of screening by creating
the Displaced Persons Commission (DP Commission),4 which was responsible for investigating the background of each applicant."7 Each applicant, however, had the burden of proving his eligibility. 48 The DP
Commission eventually delegated its responsibility to the United States
Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). The CIC did not have access to
the records of Eastern European applicants and was therefore unable to
ascertain whether these persons were Nazi collaborators. 49 The only documents available to CIC investigators were United States military and
government records, and certain records in the Berlin Document Center
(BDC). The BDC, captured at the close of the war, housed the personal
records of members of the Nazi party and SS that originated in Germany and Austria. The records of Eastern European collaborators were
either destroyed or held by the Soviets. In either case, they remained
unavailable to the CIC. A BDC check on Volksdeutche was therefore
often futile, limiting the CIC investigation to documentation of an applicant since he had entered Germany and the DP camps. 50
In effect, the DP Act facilitated the entry of Nazis into the United
States by awarding preference to groups which, like the Volksdeutche,
were filled with Nazi collaborators. In addition, the bureaucratic admin-

42. IRO Constitution, supra note 23, Annex 1, pt. 1, § C, 62 Stat. 3037, 3050-51,
T.I.A.S. No. 1846, at 15-16, 18 U.N.T.S. 3, 19-20.
43. Id., Annex I, pt. II, § 2(a), 62 Stat. 3037, 3051-52, T.I.A.S. No. 1846, at 17, 18
U.N.T.S. 3, 20.
44. R. RYAN, supra note 21, at 20.
45. Id.

46. DP Act § 8, 62 Stat. at 1012.
47. Id., § The DP Commission was charged by executive order with the responsibility of preparing eligibility reports. Executive Order No. 10,003, 3 C.F.R. 229 (Supp.
1948).

48. DP Act § 10, 62 Stat. at 1013.
49. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 21.
50. See id. at 21-22.
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istration of the Act rendered the IRO and CIC investigators virtually
incapable of properly screening applicants. Notwithstanding the odd occasion when a Jewish DP spotted a Nazi collaborator, or a fellow DP
turned over information or prevented some illegitimate entry, or where
an applicant admitted his membership in a military organization, the
screening process was in large part unreliable.51
52
On June 16, 1950, Congress amended the Displaced Persons Act.
Primarily, Congress eliminated the 1945 cut-off date,5" thereby opening
the door to thousands of previously ineligible displaced persons, including many Jews. In addition, Congress increased the number of authorized visas to 341 ,0005" and eliminated the quota preferences for Balts
and farmers.55
Four hundred thousand persons entered the United States under the
DP Act before it expired in 1952: 337,000 (eighty-five percent) displaced
persons and 63,000 (fifteen percent) Volksdeutsche. 56 Although only a
small percentage of these immigrants actually committed war crimes,
many were Nazi sympathizers. An estimated 10,000 alleged Nazi war
criminals entered the United States under the DP Act. 57 Although the
numbers are imprecise, the facility with which any Nazi war criminal
entered this country is significant.
IV.

THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE AND NAZI

INVESTIGATIONS:

1945-1973

"This is one of those cases where the imagination is baffled by the facts."
-Winston

Churchill

8

Although government officials knew that alleged Nazi war criminals
entered the United States during the late 1940s and early 1950s, they
made little effort to locate and prosecute them for nearly thirty years.
51. For example, the 30% quota for farmers produced a mass of counterfeit agriculturalists. By 1951, 90% of the "farmers" were no longer with their United States farm
sponsors. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 24. This need to fill quotas substantially impaired
the safeguards against Nazi immigration.
52. Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950) (expired 1952).
53. Id., § 2(d), 64 Stat. at 219.
54. Id., § 3(a), 64 Stat. at 221.
55. Id., § 3, 64 Stat. at 221-23.
56. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 25.
57. Id. at 26. The exact number is unkown, and estimates vary.
58. Sir Winston Churchill made this remark in the House of Commons on May 13,
1941 following the parachute descent of Rudolf Hess into Scotland. It seems particularly
appropriate to the INS' inactivity for 30 years following World War II.
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Government efforts to identify and deport ex-Nazis through the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) between 1945 and the 1970s
were superficial and ineffective. During this period, the INS filed fewer
than ten cases against alleged Nazi collaborators. Of these cases, only
one resulted in deportation.5 9
Although the INS' inefficiency in handling alleged Nazi war criminals
in the United States may be attributed to various administrative
problems, the rapid shift in focus of attention of the Department of Justice from Nazism to communism following World War II proved to be
the underlying cause. The Department of Justice concentrated its efforts
on combating communism and, consequently, treated immigration in
general, and the prosecution of war criminals specifically, as a low priority. As a result, the INS, which is part of the Department of Justice,
received limited funding and adopted a position of relative autonomy.
Almost 400,000 immigrants flooded United States shores from 1948 to
1952 and ultimately settled all over the country.6" Because INS investigations into the backgrounds of these immigrants proceeded through
many district offices rather than through the main office in Washington,
D.C., INS investigators operated without any central control authority.
Furthermore, INS afforded the investigations into alleged Nazi backgrounds no special treatment. It handled those cases just as any other
immigration case.6 1 Given this background, the results are disappointing
but not unexpected.6 2 Prior to 1973, the INS filed nine claims against
persons alleged to be Nazi collaborators.6" The trial court acquitted the
defendants in three cases and the INS did not appeal. 64 Although in six
cases the trial court ordered deportation, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld three and reversed three. 65 Based on this record, one
could conclude that the INS never pursued earnest investigation and
prosecution of Nazi war criminals in the United States.
In response to vocal congressional demands, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) in 1978 investigated INS handling of Nazi war criminals

59.

A.

RYAN,

supra note 21, at 31. The sole deportee was Ferenc Vajta, who

worked for United States intelligence agencies in Italy following World War II. For a
detailed account of his story, see id. at 37-41.

60. See id. at 32.
61.

62.
42.
63.
64.
65.

Id.

For an in-depth look at INS activity regarding Nazi war criminals, see id. at 32Id. at 42.
Id.
Id.
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in the United States and presented its findings to Congress.6 6 The GAO
report revealed that although the INS filed charged against only nine
people between 1946 and 1973, it received allegations against fifty-seven
individuals concerning a history of Nazi involvement.0 7 The GAO probe
reviewed the INS' treatment of forty cases concluding that one-half had
not been investigated at all,"8 and that fifteen had received "deficient or
perfunctory" treatment.6 9 According to the report, thirty-five of the forty
cases were inadequately investigated. The GAO concluded that although
nine of those thirty-five cases did not merit investigations,"0 no satisfactory explanation existed for inadequate review of the other twenty-six. 1
Although the GAO investigation did not discover a conspiracy to suppress INS investigations into alleged Nazi war criminal backgrounds,7 2 it
recognized the probability of an ongoing controversy.7 3 The GAO report
concluded that the INS' failure to undertake an earnest investigation of
Nazi war criminals in the United States stemmed from the INS, prior to
1973, placing priority on combating communism, smuggling, and racketeering. 4 Strong congressional reaction to the report, primarily from
Representatives Joshua Eilberg of Pennsylvania and Elizabeth Holtzman of New York, suggested that an amended approach to Nazi investigations was inevitable.
CONGRESSIONAL OUTCRY AND NECESSARY CHANGES:

V.

1973-1979

5
In 1973, the much publicized case of Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan
culminated in her extradition to West Germany. Braunsteiner was one

66.

GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF

THE UNITED STATES, WIDESPREAD CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT PROBES OF ALLEGED
NAZI

WAR CRIMINALS

MAY

CONTINUE, REPORT

NOT SUPPORTED

BY AVAILABLE EVIDENCE-CONTROVERSY

No. GGD-78-73, pp. 32-39 (May 15, 1978), reprinted in

Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess.
159 (1977) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
67. Id. at 8, reprinted at 179.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 11-12, reprinted at 182-83.
70. Of those nine cases, six of the people had died, and three were flimsy cases. Id.
at 13, reprinted at 184.
71. Id. at 9, reprinted at 180.
72, Id.
73. Id. at 43, reprinted at 214. The GAO noted that it "could not absolutely rule
out the possibility of undetected, isolated instances of deliberate obstruction of investigations of some alleged Nazi criminals." Id. at i; reprinted at 161.
74. Id. at 16, reprinted at 186.
75. In re Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 470 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973).
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of the most vicious female guards at Maidenek-a killing center created
in 1942 outside Lublin, Poland. Braunsteiner was renowned for her
fierce whip which had leather straps filled with lead bullets, and for
beating women prisoners and their small children to death as they
stepped off the cargo trains."6 In 1964, Simon Weisenthal7 and Joseph
Lelyveld, a New York Times journalist, tracked down Braunsteiner in
Queens, New York where she lived with her husband under the name
Hermine Ryan.
The investigations and hearings into Braunsteiner's background lasted
until 1973. On March 22, 1973, the West German Government requested Bruansteiner's extradition. 8 United States officials then arrested
her and held her in New York. On May 1, 1973, after reviewing overwhelming evidence, the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York ordered Braunsteiner returned to West Germany to stand trial. 9
The trial in Germany lasted nearly six years.8 0 On June 30, 1981, the
German court convicted Braunsteiner of multiple murder."1 She is currently serving a life sentence in a German prison. The Braunsteinercase
focused public awareness on the issue of Nazi war criminals in the
United States. The case demonstrated the United States Government's
general disinterest and inaction with respect to Nazi war criminals in
this country during the preceding twenty-five years.
In 1973, Dr. Otto Karbach of the World Jewish Congress gave the
INS a list of fifty-nine alleged Nazi collaborators living in the United
States. 2 The INS subsequently established a "project control office" to
investigate these accusations and provide a system for gathering evidence. 8 Although this "office" consisted of only one individual, INS investigator Sam Zutty, it nonetheless marked the first time since the Nu-

76. For a more detailed account of the Braunsteiner case, see A. RYAN, supra note
21, at 46-52.
77. Wiesenthal was born in 1908 near Lvov, Poland, now part of the USSR. In July
1941, shortly after the German invasion, Wiesenthal, an architect at the time, was arrested by the Ukranian militia. In 1945 he was liberated from the Mauthausen concentration camp, and he quickly began working for the Counter Intelligence Corps of the
United States Army, locating his former Nazi captors. In 1947 Wiesenthal established an
office in Austria to identify and locate Nazi war criminals still at large. Wiesenthal became famous in the early 1960s when he was instrumental in the capture of Adolf Eichmann. The Simon Wiesenthal Center still operates today.
78. In re Ryan, 360 F. Supp. at 271.
79. Id. at 275.
80. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 52.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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remberg Trials that the United States Government investigated Nazi
war criminals as a distinct group.
The task proved to be far too extensive for one individual, especially
since there were no preexisting methods for tracking these people down
and investigating their past. Furthermore, the State Department was not
84
very helpful in locating and acquiring evidence from other countries.
The INS' inability to achieve positive results again prompted congressional response.
In June 1974, Congressman Joshua Eilberg, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, wrote a stinging letter to Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger conveying his "deep concern over the Department of State's
failure to cooperate with the Department of Justice in its investigation of
the alleged Nazi war criminals currently residing in the United
States." 5 Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Linwood Holton responded that although the Department of State would
"give serious consideration to German requests for extradition," with regard to obtaining evidence and interviewing witnesses abroad "there is
no agreement between the U.S. and the USSR permitting investigations
or the taking of testimony or statements of Soviet citizens by U.S. officials in the USSR. '8'6 Heated correspondence continued until the Department of State agreed to meet with the INS to evaluate the Nazi war
7
criminal problem.
Congressman Eilberg seized another opportunity to voice his discontent when, in August 1974 (two weeks after President Nixon's resignation) he wrote President Ford alerting him to the State Department's
apparent reluctance "to initiate discussions with foreign governments."8 8
Eilberg concluded by asking the President to "use the power of [his]
office to require the Department of State to effect the coordination, cooperation, and initiative which is necessary to determine whether or not the
alleged Nazi war criminals in the United States are subject to denatural-

84.
85.

Id. at 52-53.
Letter from Joshua Eilberg to Henry A. Kissinger (June 26, 1974), reprintedin

Alleged Nazi War Criminals:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess.
69 (1979) [hereinafter August, 1977 Hearing].
86. Letter from Linwood Holton to Joshua Eilberg (July 5, 1974), reprinted in
August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 70.
87. Letter from Linwood Holton to Joshua Eilberg (Aug. 1, 1974), reprinted in
August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 71.
88. Letter from Joshua Eilberg to President Ford (Aug. 22, 1974), reprintedin August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 71.

1986]

NAZI WAR CRIMINALS

ization, extradition, or deportation." 9 The White House acceded to the
wishes of the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. On November 21,
1974 an administrative official reported that the Department of State
was planning approaches to the German, Israeli, Polish, Hungarian, and
Soviet Governments concerning the fifty-nine names submitted to the
INS by Dr. Karbach in 1973.90

International cooperation in locating and prosecuting Nazi war
criminals appealed to officials in Germany, Israel, and the Soviet Union.
They suggested that the United States develop a plan. 91 In July 1975,
the Department of State formally requested the West German government to furnish whatever evidence it possessed relating to the allegations
in Dr. Karbach's list.9 2 The State Department planned to assess the out-

come of the request to Germany and consider approaching other govern93
ments, particularly the Soviet Union, with similar requests.
International cooperation finally became a reality, but the tangible
benefits were not forthcoming. By the end of October 1975, the West
German Government produced useful information on only six of the
fifty-nine cases presented to them, and "additional but unsubstantiated
allegations against ten others."9 4 As a result, the Department of State
maintained its reluctance to formally approach the Soviets. 95
The West German Government continued to supplement its original
production of information. On January 12, 1976, the Department of
State reported that the West Germans provided information on twentysix cases. 98 One month later, the Department of State formally approached the Soviet Union.9" The INS also enlisted the help of the Is-

89.

Id. at 71.

90. Letter from Max L. Friedersdorf to Joshua Eilberg (Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted
in August, 1977 Hearing,supra note 85, at 72-73.
91. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 55.
92. See Letter from Robert J. McCloskey to Joshua Eilberg (July 29, 1975), re-

printed in August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 75-76. The United States Embassy
in Bonn made the official request to the Federal Republic of Germany by diplomatic

Note on July 14, 1975 after the U.S. Mission in Berlin made a preliminary background
check from the Berlin Document Center. Id.
93. Id. at 75.
94. See Letter from Leonard F. Walentynowicz to Joshua Eilberg (Oct. 31, 1975),

reprinted in August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 76.
95. See id. at 77.
96. See Letter from Leonard F. Walentynowicz to Joshua Eilberg (Jan. 12, 1976),
reprinted in August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 78.
97. Letter from Lawrence S. Eagleburger to Joshua Eilberg (Feb. 10, 1976), reprinted in August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 78.
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raeli police unit on Nazi war criminals to locate witnesses in Israel.9 8
Organized international cooperation resulted in a willingness of foreign
governments to provide the United States with available evidence and
witnesses.
As the available evidence grew, the issue became whether the United
States Government was properly handling it. In June 1976, Congressman Eilberg accused the Department of State, and specifically Attorney
General Edward Levi of treating the identification and prosecution of
Nazi war criminals in the United States as a "non-priority issue." 99
Eilberg further charged that "the Immigration and Naturalization Service is not making proper use of available evidence in the alleged Nazi
war criminal cases," and urged the INS to "expedite the preparation of
cases." 100 In August 1976, the INS responded by announcing an intention "to initiate proceedings against seven persons in the United States
who are alleged to have committed war crimes during and prior to
°
World War II.' 101
The INS filed charges against ten alleged Nazi war criminals over the
next ten months.102 The filing proved to be premature because the INS
lacked sufficient documentation to corroborate witness testimony; government lawyers were inadequately prepared; and Soviet witnesses remained unavailable. Furthermore, the INS made no attempt to locate
survivors located in the United States and neglected to take the testimony
of aging survivors, hoping they would live long enough for trial.1 0 3
Members of Congress noted the INS' handling of these cases. In August 1977, Leonel J. Castillo, Commissioner of the INS, testified before
Congressman Eilberg's Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and
International Law. 04 Mr. Castillo announced the dissolution of Sam
Zutty's "project central office," and the creation of a special centralized
unit under the direct control of the General Counsel of the INS."0 5 This

98. See A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 55.
99. Letter from Joshua Eilberg to Edward H. Levi (June 25, 1976), reprinted in
August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 79.
100. Id. at 79.
101. INS Press Release (Aug. 12, 1976), reprintedin August, 1977 Hearing,supra
note 85, at 81-82.
102. On October 13, 1976, the INS filed deportation charges against two Latvians
and one Lithuanian. The subsequent seven suits were against one Latvian alien and
against six U.S. citizens: four Ukranians, one Lithuanian, and a Polish Volksdeutsche. A.
RYAN, supra note 21, at 59.
103. Id. at 59; August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 26-27.
104. August, 1977 Hearing, supra note 85, at 22.
105. Id. at 24.
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litigation unit would assume full control of the Nazi cases, and the files
would be reviewed by attorneys, rather than by INS investigators; the
attorneys could deal directly with the Department of State to coordinate
foreign investigations.1 0 8 The benefits of the litigation unit failed to materialize. The attorneys lacked the necessary experience to conduct efficient investigations, and, as a result, by 1979 they had not filed any
charges."0 ' Between 1977 and 1979, this litigation unit tried only five of
the cases filed by Zutty's project central office.1 08 This ineffectiveness
signaled the end of the INS' handling of Nazi war criminals in the
United States.
As chairman of the House Immigration Subcommittee, Elizabeth
Holtzman in 1979 relentlessly pressured the Department of Justice to
relieve the INS of all responsibility for the Nazi cases and create a new
department with greater resources.'O" Although the Department of Justice initially resisted the proposal, Attorney General Griffin Bell announced on March 28, 1979, that the Justice Department would handle
the matter itself. Congress allocated 2.8 million dollars to support an
ungraded staff, thus relieving the INS of its responsibility for Nazi war
criminals. 110 As a result, the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) became the section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
which handled the investigation and prosecution of Nazi war criminals
living in the United States.1 1 Since its creation, the OSI has instituted
numerous denaturalization suits against alleged Nazi war criminals, and,
most recently, has assisted foreign governments in securing the extradition of individuals who face criminal prosecution in other countries for
their past activities.1 1 2

106. Id.
107. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 60.
108. "Three were lost; one was discontinued; the fifth was won, but with highly
embarassing consequences." Id. at 60. The lone government victory was against Frank
Walus, accused of being a member of the Gestapo in Poland. Judge Julius Hoffman of
Chicago revoked Walus' citizenship. On appeal, however, Walus introduced new evidence and the verdict was set aside with an order for a new trial. Evidence later showed
that Walus was, in fact, the wrong man-he was on a farm in Germany throughout
World War II. United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1978), vacated, 616
F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980). For a detailed account of the Walus case, see A. RYAN, supra
note 21, at 191-217.
109. Congressman Eilberg lost his re-election bid in 1978.
110. Hearing on Alleged Nazi War Criminals Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 122-30 (1979) [hereinafter March, 1979 Hearing].
111. 44 Fed. Reg. 54,045 (1979) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 0.55 (1986)).
112. A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 62.
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THE DENATURALIZATION PROCESS

Absent an extradition request from another country with criminal jurisdiction over alleged Nazi war criminals, the United States is limited to
prosecuting these individuals under existing immigration law. 1 ' Virtually all legal actions brought against alleged Nazi war criminals in the
United States are denaturalization proceedings instituted by the government. If successful, a denaturalization suit deprives the individual of
114
United States citizenship and subjects him to deportation.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952"' (INA) listed various
classes of aliens subject to deportation. Four of these categories could
encompass Nazi war criminals living in the United States:
1. Aliens who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
(other than a purely political offense), or aliens who admit having committed such a crime,110
2. Any alien who seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a visa or other documentation, or seeks to enter the United States,
by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact,'""
3. Aliens who are members of or affiliated with.

tarian party of.

.

.

. (iv)

. .

. [the] totali-

. any foreign state, or of any political or geographical

subdivision of any foreign state, or . . . (vi) the direct predecessors or

successors of any such association or party," 8
4. Any alien in the United States. . . who at the time of entry was within
one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the
time of such entry." 9
In October 1978, Congress amended the INA to exclude Nazi war
criminals from eligibility for United States visas, and to make those indi113. The Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952 established the basic
structure of existing immigration and nationality law in the United States. Act of June
27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982))
[hereinafter INA].
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (a). See infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text (deportation
becomes difficult because few countries are willing to accept Nazi war criminals).
115. See supra note 113.
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9). This section lists various requirements which limit its
potential applicability to Nazi war criminals.
117. Id., § 1182(a)(19).
118. Id., § 182(a)(28)(C). "This provision is limited by the requirement that a totalitarian party must advocate the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship or totalitarianism." Lippman, The Denaturalizationof Nazi War Criminals in
the United States: Is Justice Being Served?, 7 Hous. J. INT'L LAW 169, 180 n.68
(1985).
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). Regarding Nazi war criminals, this provision could be
used in reference to the DP Act.
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viduals deportable. This amendment addressed:
Any alien who during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with(A) the Nazi government of Germany,
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the
Nazi government of Germany,
(C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the
Nazi government of Germany, or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of
Germany,
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political

opinion."2 °
In effect, the new clause added to the class of deportable Nazi war
criminals those who entered the United States under the INA rather
121
than DP Act or the Refugee Relief Act.
It is the duty of United States district attorneys to bring denaturalization suits against any individuals whose certificate of naturalization and
order of citizenship "were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation .

.

122

The

Government must prove its case by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
1 24 If
evidence.1 23 Once denaturalized, the alien is subject to deportation.
found deportable by an immigration judge,1 25 the alien may appeal the
decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 1 2 and the order is

120. Act of October 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33) (1978)).
121. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953), was
enacted to further assist post-World War II refugees fleeing communist-controlled Europe. H.R. REP. No. 974, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953), reprintedin 1953 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2103, 2104. Though the Act did not specifically exclude Nazi
war criminals, it held, inter alia: "No visa shall be issued under this Act to any person
who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of persons
because of race, religion, or national origin." Refugee Relief Act § 14(a), 67 Stat. 400,
406 (1953). War criminals who entered under the DP Act or Refugee Relief Act were
already deportable under the INA, though mere membership in the Nazis did not justify
excludability. Lippmah, supra note 118, at 180 & n.64.
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982).
123. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (plurality opinion).
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
125. Id., § 1252(b).
126. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1984).
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then subject to judicial review in the federal court system. 12 7 The recent
denaturalization suits instituted by the government against Nazi war
criminals required the interpretation of many of the statutory standards. 128 The controlling case, decided by the United States Supreme
129
Court in 1981, is Fedorenko v. United States.
A.

The Judicial History of Fedorenko v. United States

Feodor Fedorenko, a Ukranian, was conscripted into the Soviet Army
in June 1941, when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. The
Germans captured Fedorenko and sent him to Trevnicki, a prisoner-ofwar camp, where most of the guards were Volksdeutsche. 13 ° The
Germans beat Fedorenko, but his hard work at the camp brought him
occasional rewards. In 1942, Fedorenko was sent to Lublin, Poland
where the prisoners guarded their own camp. In addition, the Germans
sent the prisoners to the nearby Jewish ghetto to enforce the will of the
Nazis. At Lublin, Fedorenko was converted from a worker to a guard.
Finally, in September 1942, the Germans transferred Fedorenko as a
prisoner-guard to the Treblinka concentration camp. s1 After the war,
Fedorenko lived in a DP camp near Hamburg, Germany where he
worked for the British.13 2 In October 1949, he applied for a visa under
the DP Act. Fedorenko came to the United States on November 5, 1949
and went to work as a farmer in Connecticut.1 "
At trial in 1977, the government produced six witnesses who testified
to "specific instances of murder or brutality on the part of the defendant."1314 The government, however, produced no documentary evidence to
corroborate the witnesses' testimony.'3 Fedorenko did admit, however,
to misrepresenting his history to the DP Commission. 3 In addition he
failed to disclose his service as a guard at Treblinka on both his application for naturalization in 1969, and to INS examiners. Despite these
127.

8 U.S.C. § 1105(a).

128. See Lippman, supra note 118, at 178-82.
129. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
130. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 900 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
131. Id. at 900-01.
132. Id. at 911.

133. Id.
134. Id. at 901-02. The atrocities included shooting prisoners and beating them with
a leather whip with lead balls in the straps. Id. at 902-03.
135. Id. at 902.
136. Fedorenko told the Commission that he was born in Poland and lived there
until 1942 when he was deported to Germany and forced to work in a factory in Poelitz.
Fedorenko also stated that following the war he fled to Hamburg, Germany. Id. at 911.
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misrepresentations, the INS recommended to the court that Fedorenko's
petition for naturalization be granted, and on April 23, 1970, he became
37
a United States citizen.1
The government charged that because Fedorenko served as an armed
guard at Treblinka and committed atrocities against inmates, he should
have been denied a visa under the DP Act.1 38 Further, because
Fedorenko "willfully concealed this information" when applying for a
visa and again when applying for citizenship, he entered the country and
procured his citizenship illegally." 9
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
entered judgment for the defendant.1 40 Applying the standards for "materiality" set forth in Chaunt v. United States'4 ' the court held, "immigration laws prohibit giving . . . false answers and . . .therefore any
mispresentation is 'illegal', once citizenship has been confirmed it may be
taken away only if it can be clearly and convincingly shown that the
142
misrepresentation was 'material'."'
In Chaunt the Supreme Court required "clear and convincing proof
that either (1) facts were suppressed 'which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship' or (2) that their disclosure 'might have been
useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts
warranting denial of citizenship'."' 4 The district court held44 that the
government failed to satisfy either prong of the Chaunt test.1
In addition, the district court ruled that equity demands consideration
of mitigating circumstances, even if Fedorenko had concealed material
facts.' 45 The court found the defendant to be "an unsophisticated man

137. The Superior Court of New Haven granted Fedorenko's petition for naturalization. 449 U.S. at 497.
138. Id. at 497-98.
139. Id. at 498.
140. 455 F. Supp. at 921.
141. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
142. 455 F. Supp. at 915.
143. Id. (quoting Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. at 355).
144. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court questioned the reliability of the expert
testimony which claimed that all concentration camp guards were ineligible for visas
under the DP Act. Id. at 912-13. The court pointed out that kapos - Jewish guards
selected by the Nazis to "control" fellow prisoners - often did only what they were
forced to, and witnesses would be very reluctant to testify against such people. "The
difficulty with that construction is that it would bar every Jewish prisoner who survived
Treblinka because each one of them assisted the SS in the operation of the camp. Each
did so involuntarily and under the utmost duress." Id. at 913. The court considered
Federenko's action to be involuntary. Id.
145. Id. at 918.
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with very little education who is not only willing but anxious to work,"
and "a man who is not interested in 'making waves' or causing
trouble. 11 46 Thus, the court seized an opportunity to exercise discretion,
47
and concluded that the equities weighed in favor of Fedorenko.
Although the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that Chaunt
is the controlling test, it held that the government need not "prove the
existence of facts which, in and of themselves, would have justified denial
of citizenship. ' 148 In reversing and remanding to the district court, the
Fifth Circuit held that the government must show only that the misrepresentation "might, if disclosed, have led to the discovery of other facts,
which would have justified denial of citizenship."'1 49 Applying the second
prong of the Chaunt test, the court concluded that "[t]he evidence before
the district court clearly and convincingly proved that had the defendant
disclosed his guard service, the United States authorities would have conducted an inquiry that might have resulted in a denial of a visa."' 5
Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in exercising discretion by balancing equities in favor of Fedorenko. The court
acknowledged a distinction between the district court's authority to grant
citizenship and to revoke citizenship and held that "[olnce it has been
determined that a person does not qualify for citizenship . . . the district
court has no discretion to ignore the defect and grant citizenship."','
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision," 2 recognizing that "there must be strict compliance with all congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship."' 5 3 The majority
noted that the judiciary can not bend or change immigration law. Specifically, Justice Marshall wrote, "this judicial insistence on strict compliance with the statutory conditions precedent to naturalization is simply
an acknowledgement of the fact that Congress alone has the constitu-

146.

Id. at 920.

147. Id. at 920-21.
148. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 947, reh'g en bane denied, 601 F.2d
1195 (5th Cir. 1979).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 953.
151. Id. at 954. The appellate court pointed out that "[t]he denaturalization statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1451, does not accord the district courts any authority to excuse the fraudulent procurement of citizenship." 597 F.2d at 954.
152. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result; Justice Blackmun concurred in the result in a separate opinion;
Justices White and Stevens wrote separate dissenting opinions.

153. Id. at 506.
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tional authority to prescribe rules for naturalization.

15 4

Once it clarified the appropriate judicial role, the Supreme Court considered the facts in Fedorenko. The Court held:
[t]here was no dispute that petitioner "lied" in his application. Thus, petitioner falls within the plain language of the DPA's admonition that "[any
person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the purposes of
gaining admission into the United States as an eligible displaced person
shall thereafter not be admissible to the United States. 1 5
The Court next addressed the issue of "material misrepresentation." The
Court adopted the standard that "the materiality of a false statement in a
visa application must be measured in terms of its effect on the applicant's admissibility into this country." ' 6 In the instant case, "disclosure
of the true facts about petitioner's service as an armed guard at Treblinka would, as a matter of law, have made him ineligible for a visa
'1 7
under the DPA. 5
The Court finally addressed Fedorenko's procurement of citizenship
and reasoned that the INA "required an applicant for citizenship to be
lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence." '5 The
majority concluded that "inasmuch as petitioner failed to satisfy a statutory requirement which Congress has imposed as a prerequisite to the
acquisition of citizenship by naturalization, we must agree with the Government that petitioner's citizenship must be revoked because it was 'illegally procured.' "159 Finally, the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit
that the district courts lacked equitable discretion to withhold a denaturalization judgment. 60 The principles of material misrepresentation established in Fedorenko apply in virtually all denaturalization proceedings against Nazi war criminals in the United States.
B.

DenaturalizationCases Since Fedorenko

In addition to the Fedorenko material misrepresentation analysis,
United States courts have relied on the provisions of the DP Act to revoke the citizenship of Nazi war criminals.

154. Id.
155. Id. at 507 (quoting DP Act, § 10, 62 Stat. at 1013).
156. 449 U.S. at 509.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 514. The Court specifically considered sections 316(a) and 318 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1429 (1983)).
159. 449 U.S. at 515.
160. Id. at 517.
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In United States v. Osidach,16 ' for example, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania revoked the citizenship of
a former member of the Nazi-sponsored Ukranian police. Relying on
section 13 of the DP Act, 6 2 the court found that Osidach was a voluntary member of the movement hostile to the United States.'6 3 The court
concluded that the defendant's initial visa was invalid because his entry
was unlawful. Consequently, his procurement of a certificate of naturalization was illegal.' 64
The facts in United States v. Demjanjuk 6 5 are similar to those in
Fedorenko. The defendant served in the Soviet Army until his capture
by the Germans. Eventually, Demjanjuk worked as a guard at Treblinka."' The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio relied on section 10 of the DP Act

67

and found that Demjanjuk

materially misrepresented his background. The court held that because
Demjanjuk's entry was illegal, his visa was invalid.16 8 The Sixth Circuit
denied a retrial, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.169
In United States v. Linnas,17 0 the District Court for the Eastern District of New York revoked the citizenship of a former member of the
Estonian Home Guard,'17 a group which assisted occupying Nazi forces
in the prosecution of civilians during World War 11.117 2 The government
introduced sufficient evidence to establish that Linnas was the Commandant at the Tartu Concentration Camp in Estonia.17 The court then
applied sections 10 and 13 of the DP Act'7 4 and found that Linnas pos-

161. 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
162. DP Act § 13, 62 Stat. at 1014.
163. 513 F. Supp. at 95-96. The court also noted that Osidach assisted in the persecution of civilians. Id. at 96-97.
164. Id. at 100.
165. 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982). The Demjanjuk extradition proceedings are discussed
infra notes 247-81 and accompanying text.
166. 518 F. Supp. at 1363-76.
167. DP Act, supra note 22, § 10, 62 Stat. at 1013.
168. 518 F. Supp. at 1380-82. As an independent ground for revoking Demjanjuk's
certificate of naturalization, the court relied on fraudulent procurement. Id. at 1382-83.
169. United States v. Demjanjuk, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1036 (1982).
170. 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd mem., 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982).
171. The Germans referred to this Group as the "Selbstschutz." 685 F.2d at 430.
172. Id. at 430-31.
173. Id. at 434.
174. DP Act §§ 10, 13, 62 Stat. at 1013, 1014.
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sessed an invalid visa.17 5 As an alternative ground for denaturalization,
the court found Linnas had procured his citizenship through concealment and misrepresentation of his past services.1 " 6 The Second Circuit
affirmed the revocation of citizenship and the Supreme Court declined to
177
hear the case.
In United States v. Dercacz,.71 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York found no triable issue of fact in a case
against a former member of the Nazi-sponsored Ukranian police.17 9 Applying section 2(b) of the DP Act, 80 the court held that Dercacz, as a
matter of law, was ineligible for a visa at the time of his application. 8 1
He therefore procured his visa through willful misrepresentation of a
niaterial fact under section 10 of the DP Act. 82 Additionally, Dercacz
willfully misrepresented material facts on his application for naturaliza18 4
tion,"" and the court revoked his citizenship on both grounds.
All of these cases relied on one or more of the three applicable sections
in the DP Act, sections 2(b), 10, and 13, to revoke the citizenship of
Nazi war criminals living in the United States. These sections unavoidably overlap in the courts' analyses.1 8 5 For example, if the defendant was
ineligible for a visa under section 2(b), then he willfully misrepresented
a material fact under section 10, and his visa was illegally procured. 8 '
Although the OSI generally prosecutes Nazi war criminals in the
United States in denaturalization suits, it occasionally has negotiated the
voluntary surrender or renunciation of citizenship of individuals under

175. 527 F. Supp. at 439.
176. Id. at 440. Karl Linnas currently faces possible deportation to the Soviet Union,
where he has been sentenced to death as a Nazi war criminal. Linnas has not yet found
another country that will grant him refuge. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1987, at A14, col. 1.
177. Affid mem., 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1982).
178. 530 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
179. Id. at 1351.
180. DP Act, § 2(b), 62 Stat. at 1009.
181. 530 F. Supp. at 1351.
182. DP Act, § 10, 62 Stat. at 1013; 530 F. Supp. at 1353.
183. 530 F. Supp. at 1353.
184. Id. The same sequence of events occurred in United States v. Koziy, 540 F.
Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982), affd, 728 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 130 (1984); see also, United States v. Palciauskas, 559 F. Supp. 1294 (M.D. Fla.
1983), affd, 734 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1984).
185. Moeller, United States Treatment of Alleged Nazi War Criminals: International Law, Immigration Law, and the Need for InternationalCooperation, 25 VA. J.
INT'L L. 793, 825 (1985).
186. See id. at 826.
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investigation for alleged war crimes.'8 7 In addition, several courts have
granted consent judgments against alleged Nazi war criminals.18 8 Finally, several courts have dismissed suits as moot, because the defendant
died prior to the disposition of the case. 8 '

VII.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF DENATURALIZING NAZI WAR
CRIMINALS IN THE UNITED STATES

"Commit a crime, and the earth is made of glass ....
You cannot recall
the spoken word, you cannot wipe out the foot-track, you cannot draw up
the ladder, so as to leave no inlet or clue. Some damning circumstance
always transpires."
-

Ralph Waldo Emerson"'

Securing the denaturalization of Nazi war criminals is difficult. Because the alleged criminals committed the offenses over forty years ago,

gathering sufficient admissible evidence is burdensome, requiring time,
money and international cooperation. In a denaturalization proceeding
the government must show that the defendant actually participated in

previously undisclosed activity which would have rendered him ineligible
for a United States visa. 9 1 Although denaturalization suits are civil actions, federal courts have applied criminal law standards when ruling on
the admissibility and weight of the government's evidence, further burdening the prosecution. 2

Witness bias, the susceptibility of witnesses to suggestive influences,
and the lapse of time are the primary obstacles to the acquisition of admissible eyewitness identification."9 As an alternative the government
commonly employs photographic identification. This method, however,

187. See id. at 831-33.
188. United States v. Artishenko, No. 82-3822 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 1984) (consent judgment); United States v. Trifa, No. 5-70924 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 1980) (consent judgment), affid, 662 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); United
States v. von Bolschwing, No. S-81-308 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1981) (consent judgment);
United States v. Paskevicius, No. 77-167-RF (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1979) (consent judgment). Accord Moeller, supra note 185, n.243 at 831.
189. See Moeller, supra note 185, 831 n.244.
190. Compensation, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 183
(B. Atkinson ed. 1968).
191. See Lippman, supra note 118, at 189.
192. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 905-06; United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp.
699, 712-13 (N.D. I1. 1978), rev'd, 616 F.2d 283, 292 n.15 (7th Cir. 1980); Lippman,
supra note 118, at 189-90.
193. Lippman, supra note 118, at 189.
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raises questions of reliability. In United States v. Walus, 9 4 the government used newspaper photograph advertisements to solicit Israeli citizens
who could testify about war crimes committed by Frank Walus. 19 5 Because the photos depicted the defendant years after the alleged crimes
occurred, and because the photo quality was questionable, they undermined the credibility of the witnesses' identification.'" In United States
v.Fedorenko,1 97 the district court ruled that the photographs shown to
Israeli witnesses were "impermissibly suggestive," leading "to a substantial act of misidentification." 198 Other courts have recognized the unavoidable suggestiveness of photographic identifications, and weighed the
resulting bias against witness credibility.199
The lapse of time since the alleged crimes, often exceeding forty years,
undermines the reliability of eyewitness identification of alleged Nazi
war criminals. 20 0 As Professor Lippman notes:
The indelible impact of the Holocaust on the witnesses and the witnesses'
opportunity to view their persecutors for an extended period of time must
be balanced against the fact that the witnesses more than likely were apt
to respond positively to any suggestion that a given photo was that of an
individual who perpetrated atrocities against the witnesses and their
201
friends and family.
In United States v. Kowalchuk,02 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the witnesses' testimony
about Kowalchuk's participation in alleged war crimes might be exaggerated and embellished as a result of the discussion among the witnesses
over a period of many years.2 03 The court held, therefore, that the evidence introduced by the government was insufficient to clearly and con204
vincingly show that the defendant engaged in war crimes.

194. 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980).
195. Id. at 293-94.
196. Id. at 292-94.
197. 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
198. Id. at 906.
199. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); see also Lippman,
supra note 118, at 191.
200. See Walus v. United States, 616 F.2d at 289-90; see United States ex rel.
Phipps v. Follete, 428 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1970).
201. Lippman, supra note 118, at 192.
202. 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
203. Id. at 79. The evidence did, however, show that Kowalchuk was a member of
the Ukranian militia, which assisted the occupying Nazi forces in their persecution of
civilians. Id. at 81.
204. Id. at 81. The district court revoked Kowalchuk's certificate of naturalization on
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All of the concerns about eyewitness identification are legitimate and
necessitate sufficient safeguards to guarantee due process of law at the
denaturalization proceedings. However, despite the limited number of
surviving witnesses and the unavoidable bias against defendants, courts
must not extend protections beyond those which are constitutionally
required.
An additional obstacle for the government in prosecuting Nazi war
criminals is convincing the courts of the credibility of Soviet witnesses. In
many cases Soviet citizens are the only available eyewitnesses to Nazi
war crimes. The Soviet Union has, in many instances, cooperated with
the Department of Justice and allowed its citizens to be deposed. Yet
even when both OSI prosecutors and counsel for the defendants examine
the witnesses and the court reviews videotapes of the depositions, some
federal judges doubt the credibility of Soviet testimony.
In Kowalchuk, for example, the court was concerned that the testimony of Soviet witnesses might be used as a political weapon by the
Soviet government 20 5 In United States v. Kungys,20 6 the United States
District Court for New Jersey held that depositions taken by the OSI,
with the cooperation of the Soviet government, were inadmissible to
prove the defendant's participation in war crimes. 2°7 The court maintained that the Soviet Union has "a continuing, strong state interest in a
finding that defendant was guilty. ' 203 Although the defendant did not
attempt to discredit the witnesses' testimony or the Soviet-supplied documents, the court ruled that the "government's proofs are inadequate to
'209
establish any of the bases for revocation of defendant's citizenship.
United States courts should not sacrifice due process to expedite or
enhance the prosecution of Nazi war criminals. Indeed, the criminal pro"ceedings at Nuremberg emphasized due process. The need to bring these
criminals to justice, however, requires international cooperation and
trust. United States courts should not dismiss the testimony of eyewitnesses to these atrocities simply because it comes from Soviet witnesses.

grounds of illegal procurement, id. at 83, but held that there was no justification for
revocation based on the concealment or misrepresentation of a material fact. Id. at 82.
205. 571 F. Supp. at 78; see Lippman, supra note 118, at 193.
206. 571 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J. 1983).
207. Id. at 1131-32.
208. Id. at 1126.
209. Id. at 1144. The central theme of the court's opinion was the concern that
neither side was aware of how Soviet officials might have prepared the witnesses. No
defendant in these cases is given the opportunity to investigate the circumstances under
which the KGB and procurator prepared the witnesses for interrogation by the OSL
Lippman, supra note 118, at 195 n. 160.
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Unless Soviet testimony carries legitimate weight, Nazi war criminals
will remain unpunished.
Many Nazi war criminals continue to assert the defense of duress-that their actions were "involuntary." The Military Tribunal at
'
Nuremberg recognized the "superior orders defense" 21
only when "no
'
moral choice was in fact possible."
Indeed, this defense worked for
Fedorenko at the district court level when the court found his services at

Treblinka to be involuntary.

12

"Involuntariness," an exception to ex-

cluding individuals from eligibility for a DP visa or naturalization, ensured the eligibility of the kapos-the Jewish prisoners forced to assist
the Nazis in the operation of the concentration camps and persecution of
fellow prisoners. 213 Justice Marshall, however, writing for the majority
in Fedorenko, was "unable to find any basis for an 'involuntary assistance' exception. ' 21 4 Marshall believed that the courts should not focus
on whether the conduct was voluntary, but "on whether particular con213
duct can be considered assisting in the persecution of civilians."
Professor Lippman argues that courts unfairly deny the involuntariness defense used by defendants such as Fedorenko because "various
high-level Nazi war criminals who organized the activities . . . have not

yet

been

sentences.

criminally
'21

prosecuted

or

were

given

lenient

prison

This argument ignores two important issues. First, in a

210. London Agreement, supra note 10, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 8, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548, E.A.S. No. 472, at 15, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288.
211. Lippman, supra note 118, at 201 (quoting 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 224 (1947)). The Tribunal said, "the true test ... is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice
was in fact possible." Lippman, supra note 118, at 201, n. 198.
212. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
213. See Lippman, supra note 118, at 200.
214. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
215. Id. at 512 n.34. Justice Marshall wrote:
Thus, an individual who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before
they were executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of civilians.
On the other hand, there can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and who
admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant of the
camp, fits within the statutory language about persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians.
Id.
216. Lippman, supra note 118, at 201. Professor Lippman also suggests an estoppel
defense based on evidence of United States assistance to known Nazi war criminals and
collaborators entering the United States. Id. at 196-99. Additionally, costs of prosecution,
including securing testimony of foreign witnesses and paying the investigators and prose-
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denaturalization suit the main issue is whether the defendant misrepresented a material fact when applying for a visa. The misrepresentation is
no less material because the crime committed was organized by a different individual. Second, the atrocities committed by any individual are not
excused because his "superiors" have not yet received just punishment.
As at Nuremberg, the defense of duress should be accepted only when
the defendant can demonstrate that "no moral choice was in fact possible."121 7 This standard preserves the citizenship of legitimate kapos without providing a loophole for true Nazi criminals.
VIII.

THE DEPORTATION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS

Following the denaturalization of Nazi war criminals, the government
seeks their deportation.2" 8 This two-step process represents the full extent of United States prosecution of Nazi war criminals through immigration law. An alien is deportable if he is found to be in the United
States illegally. This basic issue, in the case of Nazi war criminals, is
typically resolved during the naturalization proceedings. These individuals are almost always found deportable. Immigration law allows aliens to
apply to the Attorney General, under certain circumstances, for suspension of deportation and a restriction of the status of permanent resident
alien.2 19 A 1981 amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act,
however, denied this statutory relief to deportable Nazi war criminals.2"'
Once he is denaturalized, the alien may request voluntary departure
and leave on his own accord. 2 2' Alternatively, if a court finds him de2 22
portable, the alien may designate the country to which he is sent.

If

the alien makes no choice, he may be deported to the country from which
he came, or the country of his birth, or any other country which will
take him.2 2 The major problem with this discretionary approach is that
virtually no country is willing to accept Nazi war criminals. Those countries which will accept them, for example, Israel and the Soviet Union,
are unacceptable to the alien who would face criminal prosecution. In
most deportation cases international law requires the alien's country of

cutors salaries, inhibit prosecution. Id. at 202-05.
217. See supra note 211 (emphasis added).
218. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
219. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
220. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, §
18(h)(2), 95 Stat. 1611, 1620 (1981).
221. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1982).
222. Id., § 1253(a).
223. Id.
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citizenship to take him back.
In a Nazi deportation case and other denaturalization cases, however,
the problem is markedly different. Under the laws of most countries, the
acceptance of citizenship is accompanied by a renunciation of citizenship
in the homeland. A revocation of citizenship by the United States Government does not act to restore original citizenship; rather, it creates an
individual without a country. No nation is required to accept him. The
United States must obtain the consent of a foreign government to accept
a denaturalized person. 224 What the accepting nation does with the individual after deportation is a matter of concern to that country. A Nazi
criminal, therefore, may or may not face criminal prosecution after
deportation.
IX.

THE EXTRADITION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS -

THE CASE

OF IVAN DEMJANJUK

As noted earlier, denaturalization and deportation mark the full extent
of the United States' power to prosecute Nazi war criminals. Immigration law is, therefore, a poor substitute for the criminal justice system.
Unfortunately, most nations, including the United States, lack the requisite jurisdiction to prosecute former Nazis and collaborators because the
war crimes occurred outside their territories or against foreign citizens.2 25 This jurisdictional impediment alone should create an international obligation for every state to cooperate in returning alleged Nazi
war criminals to those countries with proper jurisdiction to prosecute.
Certain current international conventions and agreements create this
obligation. For example, in 1948, the United Nations adopted the Genoide Convention,228 designed to prevent further acts of genocide and to
punish previous acts. The United States adopted the Genocide Act in
1986. In addition, by signing the Moscow Declaration and the London
Agreement, the United States and other nations assumed both a legal
and moral obligation to extradite alleged Nazi war criminals to stand
trial in those states exercising the requisite criminal jurisdiction, or to
deliver such individuals to the International Military Tribunal.2 27 In
224. See A. RYAN, supra note 21, at 343-44. (Ryan discusses the problems arising
when no nation will accept a Nazi war criminal.)
225. Moeller, supra note 185, at 797.
226. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9,1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into twice January 12,
1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].

227. See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text; see also Moeller, supra note 185,
at 800-01. The United States Department of State still considers the London Agreement
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1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution
3, which recommended that all nations arrest war criminals and "cause
them to be sent back" to the countries where they committed their crimes
to stand trial.22 The following year, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 170 which reaffirmed the obligation to surrender Nazi war
criminals and clarified the language in Resolution 3.229 Since extradition
is a bilateral process requiring a formal request for the return of a criminal, Resolution 170 urged nations with proper jurisdiction to make such
requests and to support them with sufficient evidence to establish a
2 30
prima facie case against these criminals.
United States extradition law 2 1 authorizes any federal judge or magistrate to hear evidence on the extradition request of a foreign government with which there is a valid treaty or convention. The judicial officer determines whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the charge
under the appropriate provisions of the treaty. 3 2 If so, the judge must
certify the surrender of the individual to the Secretary of State.2 3 The
Secretary of State, at his discretion, may order the delivery of the individual to the requesting foreign state to stand trial, or he may refuse
extradition.23 '
Although the United States recognizes the "political offense" exception
to extradition, which precludes extradition for political as opposed to
criminal offenses, Congress has not codified the exception. 3 5 In Artukovic v. Boyle,238 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California granted Artukovic's petition for habeas corpus,
holding that the 1902 extradition treaty between the United States and

binding although the International Military Tribunal disbanded in 1946. See U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 304 (1984).
228. G.A. Res. 3, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 9 (1946).
229. G.A. Res. 170, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 102 (1947).
230. Id.; see Moeller, supra note 185, at 802-03.
231. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1982).
232. Id., § 3184.
233. Id., § 3186. If the judge or magistrate does not certify the extradition, the Secretary of State has no authority to surrender the individual. Id., § 3185.
234. Id., §§ 3184, 3186.
235. Moeller, supra note 185, at 805 & n.62. Many states, however, have adopted

this exception in domestic legislation. Id. at 805 n.62. Generally, the court of extradition
determines the applicability of the political offense doctrine, and if the court finds it
applies, that decision is final. Id. at 805 & n.66. If the court certifies extradition, the
Secretary of State retains the discretion to withhold extradition under the doctrine. Id. at
805-06; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3186.
236. 107 F.Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954).
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the Kingdom of Serbia2"37 was no longer in effect.2 38 On remand, the
district court held that the political offense doctrine precluded Artukovic's extradition under article VI of the treaty. 239 The district court
reasoned that since Artukovic was not charged with murder, but with
issuing orders to commit murder while serving as a government official,
he fell within the political offense exception. 240 The Supreme Court,
however, vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court. 24 1
The Ninth Circuit resolved the Artukovic litigation in February 1986,
by denying Artukovic's motion to stay his extradition order to Yugoslavia, 242 affirming the district court's express denial of the political offense
exception.

243

Consensus exists within the international community against the use
of the political offense doctrine to preclude extradition in war crimes
2 44
cases. In essence, war crimes are "the exception to the exception.
The Genocide Convention, for example, states that "[g]enocide and other
acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes
for the purpose of extradition.

' 24

5

The Artukovic decision reflects the

nonapplicability of the political offense doctrine to Nazi war crimes.
The Artukovic extradition and the Braunsteiner extradition are the
two instances when the United States has extradited a Nazi war criminal
to a European country to face criminal prosecution. The recent Artukovic and Demjanjuk214 extraditions to Israel may provide the impetus
for further extradition requests from nations exercising criminal jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals.
In Matter of Extradition of Demjanjuk,4 7 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio certified the extradition of John

237. Treaty of Extradition, Oct. 25, 1901, United States-Serbia, 32 Stat. 1890, T.S.
No. 406 [hereinafter Treaty of Extradition].
238.

107 F. Supp. at 33.

239. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956); see Treaty of Extradition, supra note 237, art. VI.
240. 140 F. Supp. at 246-47.
241. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958). On remand the district court
again denied the extradition request on the grounds of insufficient evidence and the political nature of the offenses charged. United States ex rel Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F.
Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
242. Artukovic v. Rison, 704 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
243. In re Artukovic, No. C-84-8743-R (C.D. Cal. May 1, 1985).
244. Moeller, supra note 185, at 809 & n.82.
245. Genocide Convention, supra note 226, art. VII.
246. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying notes; see also infra notes 247-81
and accompanying text.
247. 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
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Demjanjuk to the State of Israel.24 For the first time a court
extradited
249
an individual to Israel to stand trial for Nazi war crimes.
The Israeli government made the extradition request for John
Demjanjuk on October 31, 1983 pursuant to an Israeli arrest warrant
charging Demjanjuk with "the crimes of murdering Jews, which are offenses under sections 1 to 4 of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of the State of Israel." 2 50 The United States Government
filed a complaint seeking Demjanjuk's extradition to Israel, pursuant to
2 51
its obligation under the extradition treaty between the two states.
Demjanjuk, a Ukranian, had entered the United States on February 9,
1952 under the DP Act, and on November 14, 1958, he was naturalized
as a United States citizen.25 2 On June 23, 1981, the district court found
that Demjanjuk had materially misrepresented his background on both
his visa and naturalization application by failing to disclose his service as
a guard at the Trawniki and Treblinka concentration camps. Consequently, the court revoked his citizenship.23 At his deportation hearing,
the immigration judge found Demjanjuk deportable to the USSR, his
native land, but granted him the option of voluntary departure. 2 "
The district court held that the government need only establish a
primafacie case to identify the individual as the person requested by the
55
State of Israel, requiring only a threshold showing of probable cause.
The court examined documents, listened to the testimony of eyewitnesses, and viewed photographs, concluding that the government had introduced sufficient evidence to meet its burden. 58

248. Id. at 571.
249. The only other trial of a Nazi war criminal in the State of Israel was that of
Adolf Eichmann, who was convicted and hanged. Eichmann, however, was not extradited to Israel but captured in Argentina and brought back to stand trial. For an excellent account of the Eichmann capture and trial, see G. HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM

(1968), and for an account of his capture, see I.

HAREL, THE HOUSE OF

STREET (1975). See also Lippman, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and the
Protection of UniversalHuman Rights Under InternationalLaw, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L.
1 (1982).
250. 612 F. Supp. at 546 (State of Israel's request).
251. Id.; see Convention on Extradition between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the State of Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, 14 U.S.T.
1707, T.I.A.S. 5476 (entered into force Dec. 5, 1963) [hereinafter Extradition Treaty].
252. 612 F. Supp. at 546.
253. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), affd, 680
F.2d 32 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982).
254. 612 F. Supp. at 546.
255. Id. at 548.
256. Id. at 552. The court held that Demjanjuk's claim that the Soviets altered the
GARIBALDI

1986.]

NAZI WAR CRIMINALS

The district court next turned to the issue of whether the crimes alleged were within the jurisdiction of the State of Israel and were covered
by the Extradition Treaty. Israel's Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, enacted in 1950 addressed the crimes charged. The statute provides that crimes against the Jewish people or against humanity
and acts constituting war crimes which occurred during the Nazi period,
are punishable under Israeli law.2 57 The court found that Israel's jurisdiction over Demjanjuk conformed with the international law principles
of "universal jurisdiction."2'58 The court stated, "[u]niversal jurisdiction
over certain offenses is established in international law through universal
condemnation of the acts involved and general interest in cooperating to
suppress them. .. "259
In addition, the district court found that article II of the Extradition
Treaty covers the charges made by Israel.2 60 Furthermore, the State Department declared that Demjanjuk's crimes are covered by article II of
the Extradition Treaty, and the court noted that these statements "are
entitled to great weight."2' ' The court noted, however, that murdering
civilians in Nazi concentration camps in Europe during World War II is
not a prosecutable criminal offense under United States law. Under article III of the Extradition Treaty, therefore, extradition is discretionary,
and the court can only determine whether Demjanjuk can be extradited;
the Executive branch determines whether he will be extradited.26 2 The
court's analysis ignored the statutory discretion for extradition resting
exclusively with the Secretary of State. 6 3 The court concluded that "extradition treaties are to be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent

photographs was "baseless." Id. at 553.
257. Id. at 554-55, 554 n.8.
258. Id. at 555.
259. Id. at 556.
260. Id. at 559-60. Demjanjuk claimed that the Extradition Treaty does not cover
the alleged murder charges because it does not address war crimes, genocide, or crimes
against persecuted nationalities. The court dismissed this argument because it found "no
reason to presume that the Treaty drafters intended to extradite for 'murder' and not for
'mass murders.' " Id. at 561.
261. Id. at 562.
262. Id. at 561. Article III of the Extradition Treaty provides, inter alia:
When the offense has been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
requesting Party, extradition need not be granted unless the laws of the requested
Party provide for the punishment of such an offense committed in similar
circumstances.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 251, art. III.
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 1386 (1982).
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intention of the parties. '264
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether probable cause existed to conclude that the defendant committed the crimes. The court
recognized that it "does not inquire into the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It looks only to see if there is evidence sufficient to show reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty."26 The court determined that
sufficient evidence did exist to identify Demjanjuk. It reviewed the same
evidence to determine if Demjanjuk committed crimes at the concentration camps during World War II. The court held that "[t]he quantity of
evidence necessary for a determination of probable cause, as well as its
weight and sufficiency, is a matter for the extradition court's discretion. ' 2 1 In the instant case, "probable cause exists to believe respondent
committed multiple acts of murder and that he may be extradited to
Israel for those murders."26 The district court also held that article VI
of the Extradition Treaty, the "double jeopardy" clause, did not bar extradition because denaturalization and deportation proceedings are not
criminal prosecutions.2 66 The court dismissed Demjanjuk's argument
that the acts must be criminal in both the United States and Israel. Because the Extradition Treaty contemplates the alleged crimes, the United
States may surrender Demjanjuk, although the crimes are not
prosecutable offenses in this country.26 9
Finally, the district court emphatically held that the political offense
exception is inapplicable to these crimes:
The murder of Jews, gypsies and others at Treblinka was not part of a
political disturbance or struggle for political power within the Third
Reich. . . .Rather, the members of an innocent civilian population were
the intended victims of the "Final Solution." The alleged crimes were
committed without regard for the political affiliations or governmental or
270
military status of the victims.
The district court certified Demjanjuk's extradition to the State of
27 1
Israel.

264.
265.
266.
267.

612 F. Supp. at 563.
Id. at 563 (quoting Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1969)).
612 F. Supp. at 566.
Id. Demjanjuk claimed several defenses which the district court found to be

without merit. Specifically, he claimed that the Israeli statute was ex postfacto and that
it was invalid because it preceded the independence of the state of Israel. Id. at 567.
268. Id. at 569.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 570.
271. Id. at 571.

NAZI WAR CRIMINALS

1986]

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court, and upheld the certification of extradition of "Ivan the Terrible."2'72 Demjanjuk appealed the
jurisdiction issues: 273 jurisdiction of the district court to consider the extradition request, and the jurisdiction of Israel to prosecute the alleged
crimes. Again, Demjanjuk asserted that the crime with which he was
charged, "murdering thousands of Jews and non-Jews," was not covered
by the Extradition Treaty's designation of "murder."'2 74 The court rebuked this argument. The court held, "Demjanjuk's argument that to
interpret murder to include murder of Jews would amount to judicial
amendment of the Treaty is absurd and offensive.

' 27

'

Addressing the

jurisdiction of the State of Israel, the court of appeals reiterated the district court's reasoning. Article III of the Extradition Treaty gives the
requested state the discretion to honor the extradition request for extraterritorial crimes; it does not rule over extradition.2 78 Under the theory
of universal jurisdiction over these crimes, established at Nuremberg and
reaffirmed in Israel in 1961 during the Eichmann proceedings, Israel has
criminal jurisdiction over Demjanjuk, and the district court properly
2 77
honored the extradition request.

As a final matter, Demjanjuk raised the question of the application of
the "principle of speciality." This principle requires that the requesting
state not prosecute for crimes listed in the Extradition Treaty but for
which extradition was not granted. 27 ' Demjanjuk was certified as extradictable only for the charge of murder, and Israel may prosecute for
any charge included in the definition of murder.2 7' The court noted,
however, that "[t]he right to insist on application of the principle of specialty belongs to the requested state, not to the individual whose extradition is requested.

'28 0

281
The district court's decision was thus affirmed.

272. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985). At Treblinka,
Demjanjuk was known as "Ivan Grozny"-or "Ivan the Terrible."
273. Id. at 579. Demjanjuk also claimed that Judge Battisti who presided at the
denaturalization proceedings should have excused himself from the deportation hearing.

The Sixth Circuit dimissed that claim. Id. at 577.
274. Id. at 579.
275. Id. at 580.
276. Id. at 581.
277. Id. at 581-82.
278.

Id. at 583.

279.

Israel may try him for crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against human-

ity, and war crimes, for example, as long as they fall under the broad category of mur-

der. Id.
280. Id. at 584.
281. Id. The Supreme Court denied certioriari. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1198 (1986).
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The United States extradited Demjanjuk to Israel where he awaits trial.
The Demjanjuk decision is a positive example of the revived spirit of the
London Agreement and Moscow Declaration and a symbol of international cooperation that will encourage other nations with criminal jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals to make similar extradition requests.
X.

CONCLUSION

The Artukovic and Demjanjuk extraditions may encourage Israel and
other states with proper criminal jurisdiction to request the surrender of
Nazi war criminals living in the United States. The Artukovic and
Demjanjuk extradition cases exemplify a sound process for honoring
such requests without sacrificing due process protections to which every
criminal defendant is entitled and which justice demands. Other than
honoring extradition requests, the United States is limited to prosecuting
these individuals under existing immigration law - an inherently poor
substitute for criminal justice. The charge is simply entering this country
illegally, rather than committing atrocities for the "Final Solution."
The ideal procedures require rebirth of the principles and spirit of the
Moscow Declaration and London Agreement, and the reestablishment of
an international tribunal with jurisdiction over individual defendants.
Though such a move does, concededly, meet with political obstacles, its
benefit to international justice and peace is self-evident. The utilization
of international law through all organized judicial bodies to combat the
greatest meance of our time -

aggressive war -

symbolizes an aware-

ness that "[t]he common sense of mankind demands that law shall not
stop with the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must also
reach men who possess themselves of great power and make deliberate
and concerted use of it to set in motion evils which leave no home in the
world untouched." 2" 2 The motivating forces behind the Nuremberg Trials are no less important today. Once again, the great nations of the
world must band together and commit to voluntarily submit international criminals to the judgment of the law.
As the years since World War II pass, the need for international cooperation in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals grows even more urgent. Even after these criminals have died, the symbolic effect of their
prosecution will signal a recognition that all forms of aggressive warfare
cannot and will not be tolerated. If we forget the lessons of history, we
are doomed to repeat them.
David R. Gelfand
282.

R. JAcKsON, supra note 1, at 3.

